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Abstract
The role of sensory systems is to provide an organism with information about its environment. Because sensory information
is noisy and insufficient to uniquely determine the environment, natural perceptual systems have to cope with systematic
uncertainty. The extent of that uncertainty is often crucial to the organism: for instance, in judging the potential threat in a
stimulus. Inducing uncertainty by using visual noise, we had human observers perform a task where they could improve
their performance by choosing the less uncertain among pairs of visual stimuli. Results show that observers had access to a
reliable measure of visual uncertainty in their decision-making, showing that subjective uncertainty in this case is connected
to objective uncertainty. Based on a Bayesian model of the task, we discuss plausible computational schemes for that ability.
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Introduction
Every single human action happens in a context of uncertainty,
being based on incomplete knowledge and undertaken despite
unpredictable consequences. When faced with uncertainty,
humans employ heuristics [1,2] and show characteristic biases in
their decision [3]. The neural structures involved in some of these
decisions are now being identified [4–6]. Before one can make
decisions that depend on uncertain information, the degree of
uncertainty must be evaluated. The basic question of how well
humans do at evaluating their own uncertainty remains largely
understudied.
Uncertainty is a familiar concept in cognitive science, in
particular thanks to Signal Detection Theory (SDT; Green and
Swets 1966). In a typical psychophysical task, an observer has to
detect small contrast increments near threshold. The uncertainty
in this task comes mostly from internal variability: because of
fluctuations in her internal representation of contrast, the observer
makes mistakes and is uncertain about the correctness of her
decisions. Unfortunately for the experimenter, this source of the
uncertainty is internal to the observer and therefore only indirectly
controllable.
Now consider another difficult perceptual task: listening to a
speaker among cocktail-party chatter. Here the difficulty depends
not so much on variability in the brain, but rather on interactions
between the different voice signals: the one emitted by the speaker
you aim to listen to, and the sound of other voices. Even with the
volume of the other voices staying the same over time, difficulty
will depend on the languages spoken, the gender of the speakers,
and other sources of confusion. More generally, background
chatter plays the role of noise, and difficulty will vary based on
how much signal and noise covary.
An analogous visual task can be obtained by adding visual noise
to a signal –random perturbations to the stimuli shown to the
observer. Using visual noise, we are in a position to manipulate the
objective uncertainty: objective uncertainty is inversely related to the
amount of task-relevant information available in the stimulus.
Concurrently, we can measure the perceived uncertainty of the
observer, the level of confidence she actually reports. We introduce
three experiments where we manipulate objective uncertainty and
study its relationship with perceived uncertainty.
In the first two experiments, observers were presented with pairs
of images of oriented objects embedded in high levels of noise, and
had to report the orientation of the image of their choice. Even
though the two images contained the same level of noise, the
particular noise structure made one image orientation more
certain than the other. We found that observers reliably chose the
more certain of the two images, thereby providing evidence of a
capacity to accurately evaluate objective uncertainty. We con-
firmed this in another experiment, in which we held the objective
uncertainty of one of two stimuli fixed while varying the other, and
asked observers to pick the less uncertain one. The greater the
difference in uncertainty was, the greater the chance that observers
picked the less uncertain stimulus, showing that uncertainty
discrimination behaves similarly to normal psychophysical tasks.
In a third experiment, we extend our results to a letter
discrimination task. We discuss plausible computational mecha-
nisms for achieving these results.
Results
In the first two experiments, visual uncertainty was introduced
in an orientation discrimination task by manipulating the amount
of pixel noise added to a visual template. There were only two
templates, which were always visible to the observers. The
templates were left and right oriented Gabor patches that
presented alternating dark and bright lines under a blurry circular
aperture (Figure 1). We embedded the templates in noise by
adding a random perturbation to the luminance value of each
pixel of the image, independently of the other pixels: the higher
the variance of the random perturbation, the more noise. For high
noise levels, one template can be mistaken for the other.
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templates is the more probable hypothesis given the noisy stimulus.
The orientation task can be understood as a classification task
under noise, where stimuli correspond to items and the two
templates determine the two categories: our two categories are
simply defined as ‘‘stimuli generated by the left-tilted template’’,
and ‘‘stimuli generated by the right-tilted template’’. An ideal
Bayesian observer can be derived for this task, and we therefore
defined the objective uncertainty of a stimulus as the entropy of the
ideal observer’s posterior distribution over the two classes.
Stimuli and templates can be represented as vectors in a space
where dimensions correspond to the contrast of each pixel
(difference to background luminance). Let s be the stimulus, u
and v the templates (we use boldface notation for vectors). We
assume that the characteristics of the noise are known and that the
prior probabilities of the templates are equal. The posterior
probability of template u is written:
p(ujs)~
P
k
i~1
p(si;ui,s)
P
k
i~1
p(si;ui,s)z P
k
i~1
p(si;vi,s)
ð1Þ
Here i indexes the pixels from 1 to the total number k, and
p(si;ui,s) is the probability of observing value si for a Gaussian of
mean ui and standard deviation s.
An ideal observer in the discrimination task will respond by
choosing the most probable template. That decision function can
be written using the log-likelihood ratio
Lu(s)~(2s2)
{1 X k
i~1
(si{vi)
2{(si{ui)
2   
! s{v jj
2{ s{u jj
2~2(u{v)
ts ð2Þ
The latter equality comes from the fact that u kk ~ v kk , i.e., the
Figure 1. Layout of the experiment. The two templates appeared on the left- and right-hand sides of the screen. Two test stimuli were displayed
simultaneously: they were computed from one of the two templates, to which noise was added. The two test stimuli had equal contrast, as illustrated here.
Observersselected first which stimuli they felt more confident making an orientation judgment for(task 1).They were then asked to makethat judgment( ta s k2 ).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000504.g001
Author Summary
Most work in vision science focuses on the question of
why we perceive what we do, and we now have many
models explaining what physical properties of a stimulus
make us see depth, colour, etc. Here we ask instead what
makes us feel confident in our visual perception: in the
context of a visual task, what are the physical properties of
the stimulus that will make us think we are doing the task
well? The mathematical framework of Bayesian statistics
provides an elegant way to frame the problem, by
assuming that the visual system is trying to estimate
physical properties of the world from incomplete, some-
times unreliable visual information. Objective uncertainty
will therefore depend on the quality of the information
available in the stimulus. In our experiments we compare
objective uncertainty—as computed using the Bayesian
framework—with subjective uncertainty, the confidence
observers report about their visual percepts. To this end,
we use a visual task with well-defined statistical properties,
discrimination under noise. We report a surprising degree
of agreement between objective and subjective uncer-
tainty, and discuss possible computational models that
could explain this ability of the visual system.
Objective Uncertainty in the Visual System
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sign((u{v)
ts).
What is uncertainty for our ideal observer? A very general
measure of uncertainty is given by the information entropy of a
probability distribution representing a state of knowledge [7]. Here
the posterior distribution is binomial so the entropy can be written as
H(p)~{plog(p){(1{p)log(1{p) ð3Þ
When the natural logarithm is used, the entropy is measured in
natural bits or nats [8] (since some of the entropy values in
experiment 1 were very small, we used the log-entropy for
computational convenience).We show in Text S1 that the entropy
is monotonically related to the magnitude of the decision variable
defined above, and that it corresponds geometrically to Euclidean
distance to the decision boundary. Discrimination in white noise
therefore provides a visual task in whichobjective uncertainty can be
easily measured and manipulated, and compared to perceived
uncertainty.
To measure perceived uncertainty we used comparative
judgements. On every trial, observers saw a pair of noisy stimuli,
one at the top of the screen, and one at the bottom. Of the two
stimuli presented, they only had to make a discrimination
judgement about one. In this setup, if observers want to maximize
their discrimination performance, the best strategy is to choose the
more certain of the two stimuli. This is precisely what observers
were instructed to do: the task consisted in choosing, first, the
stimulus for which they felt the more confident, and only then to
make a discrimination judgment on the chosen stimulus (Figure 1).
Note that choosing the better of two stimuli is independent of
determining their nature (what template they are generated from).
In the neurological condition of blindsight [9], patients are able to
discriminate the visual properties of stimuli in a forced choice task
but they largely underestimate their performance in this task.
Observers’ performance in the choice task will thus be a measure
of their ability to access the objective uncertainty of each stimulus
and to appropriately compare these uncertainties.
Experiment 1
To determine whether observers did effectively pick the less
uncertain stimuli, we contrasted two conditions. In the so-called
True Choice (TC) condition, the two stimuli presented resulted
from independent draws from the same noise distribution. Note
that two stimuli with the same average noise level, as is the case
here, can still vary in the objective uncertainty they induce,
because different realizations of the same noise distribution can
make the stimulus more or less ambiguous. In that case there is a
benefit to be had in choosing the less uncertain of the two: this
gives observers a higher chance of responding correctly than if
only one stimulus is available.
In the other condition, the False Choice (FC) condition, we
removed that benefit: the first stimulus was computed the normal
way, but the second was obtained by flipping the top one either
once or twice (Figure 2). We took advantage of the underlying
symmetry of our templates: flipping the first template left-to-right
yields the second, and flipping the second bottom-top yields back
the first. By applying these transformations to a noisy version of
our template, we were able to create two stimuli that differed pixel-
to-pixel, but were equivalent from the point of view of the
classification task and thus carried equal objective uncertainty in that
context. In the False Choice case, there is therefore nothing to be
gained by choosing one rather than the other.
At no point in the experiment were observers aware of the
existence of the two conditions. The two stimuli presented always
Figure 2. False Choice stimuli. The left-tilted can be flipped left-to-right to yield the right-tilted template. Another flip, this time up-down, yields
back the left-tilted template. In the False Choice condition, we generated one of the stimuli at random, and used a left/right flip or a left/right flip
followed by an up/down flip to produce a stimulus with equal uncertainty but different visual aspect. We superpose the shape of a R on the images
to illustrate the transformations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000504.g002
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selecting the lower-contrast stimulus as the most certain. The False
Choice condition therefore provides the performance baseline that
will be used to determine whether or not observers are able to
successfully compare objective uncertainties.
We measured observers’ performance, defined as proportion of
correct classifications, in the two conditions across five different
signal-to-noise ratios, chosen to span a range of performance
between approximately 60 to 85%. Both the signal-to-noise ratio
and the condition each trial belonged to were randomized. If
observers are able to make accurate judgments of objective
uncertainty, then we expect that measured performance will be
higher in the TC than in the FC condition.
As expected given the nature of the task, mean performance for
all observers grew with increased signal-to-noise ratio. More
interestingly, however, mean performance is higher in the TC
condition than in the FC condition, which translates into lower
performance thresholds in the TC condition (Figure 3 a and b). To
establish that the effect is genuine we used a model comparison
technique. We used a likelihood-ratio test to evaluate the effect of
True Choice versus False Choice (details in Text S1). Using two
psychometric functions, one per condition, rather than one
psychometric function for both conditions provides a significantly
better fit to performance data (Nested hypotheses test [10]:
p=0.0004, x2~54:6, d.f.=24).
It appears then that observers were able to take advantage of the
True Choice condition, by choosing the less uncertain stimulus a
majority of the time. It seems reasonable that, should the ability to
pick the less uncertain stimulus be present, the probability of
choosing the correct stimulus ought to be an increasing function of
the magnitude of the difference: the more the two stimuli differ in
their uncertainty, the more likely observers are to choose the right
one. We evaluate that by regressing observers’ choices of stimuli
on the difference of log-entropies (Text S1). We found a highly
significant effect (details in Text S1) of the difference in uncertainty
on the probability of choosing the bottom stimulus: in other words,
the more uncertain the bottom stimulus compared to the top one,
the less likely observers were to choose the bottom one.
Experiment 2
This last result hints at a more general property: in all
psychophysical discrimination tasks, the larger the difference
between two stimuli, the more reliable discrimination is. For
example, when asked to compare the length of two lines, an
observer’s responses are likely to be better predictable when the
two lines differ by 20 cm rather than 1. In a second experiment,
we sought to confirm our findings by checking that discrimination
of uncertainty behaves in the same way. The task was identical to
that of experiment 1, but instead of introducing a False Choice
condition, we manipulated the stimuli such that one – the standard
– had always the same level of uncertainty and the other – the test
– had lower uncertainty.
We show in the supplementary material that generating random
stimuli with a controlled level of uncertainty can be achieved using
a simple orthogonal projection. Mathematically, the space of all
possible stimuli of the kind used here can be described in terms of
the contrast of individual pixels by having one dimension (one axis)
for each pixel. Then the two templates are two points u,v in that
space, and stimuli obtained by adding white noise to a template
are other points, forming Gaussian point clouds around the
templates. To decide whether a point is more likely to belong to
the left-tilted template rather than the right-tilted one, a simple
geometrical rule describes the ideal strategy.
Imagine drawing a line between u and v, as in figure 4, where
we illustrate the problem for stimuli with only 2 pixels. Now draw
the plane (in higher dimensions; the hyperplane) that is orthogonal
to the line and cuts through it at the mid-point. Then any stimuli
falling on the same side of the plane as u we will call ‘‘left-tilted’’
and any falling on the side of v we will call ‘‘right-tilted’’: the plane
represents the decision boundary. Stimuli falling right on the
hyperplane are completely ambiguous: both categories are equally
likely. In fact, it is possible to show that the uncertainty of a
Figure 3. Results - performance. (a). Results for one observer. Each point represents measured discrimination performance (probability correct)
for a given signal-to-noise ratio and condition. Two psychometric functions, one per condition, are fitted to measure performance. The psychometric
functions are distinct, indicating that performance was higher in the TC condition. (b). Aggregated results. 75% thresholds are estimated from
performance data separately for the two conditions. A higher threshold is indicative of lower performance. Error bars are standard errors obtained
from a parametric bootstrap [32].
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000504.g003
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boundary. Then the set of stimuli of fixed uncertainty is the set
of points that are of the same distance to the decision boundary,
and that set is simply the union of two parallel planes.
We therefore generated our stimuli by constraining them to lie
on a plane of distance d to the decision boundary. Standard stimuli
were always on a plane of distance dstandard and test simuli were on a
plane of distance dtest. The difference between dstandard and dtest was
varied parametrically between 4 different levels: we expected the
observers to more reliably choose the test stimulus as the difference
increased.
The results appear in figure 5: the larger the difference in
uncertainty between standard and test, the more likely observers
were to choose the test stimulus. We adapted the noise level to
each observer’s performance, so the distances used varied between
observers. We normalise them with respect to the expected
distribution of the distance to the hyperplane for the noise level
chosen (see Text S1). The effect of the difference is significant for
every observer as modeled by logistic regression of stimulus choice
on difference in uncertainty (t-test for Generalised Linear Models
coefficients, all p-values at 10
23 or below). This confirms that
uncertainty behaves in that respect just like other psychophysical
quantities: the more dissimilar two stimuli are on that scale, the
more predictable observers’ judgments are.
Experiment 3
In experiments 1 and 2, the underlying visual task is orientation
discrimination under noise, with templates identical in every way
except for one basic attribute – their orientation. To check that
our results were sufficiently general, we ran a variant of
experiment 2 using a letter discrimination task. Observers had to
discriminate between the letters ‘T’ and ‘X’ (shown on figure 5), a
pair chosen because the corresponding characters correlate very
little. Except for the nature of the templates, experiment 3 was
identical to experiment 2 and we replicated its results (figure 5):
observers were more likely to pick the less uncertain stimulus when
the difference in uncertainty was larger. Our results thus
generalize to more sophisticated visual tasks.
Computational models
Our results imply that observers had access to some estimate of
the uncertainty in the orientation task. How is that estimate
computed? Do observers have effective access to a probability
distribution over perceptual hypotheses, from which they can
estimate their own uncertainty? Or do they rely on more limited
information? To investigate that question we evaluated two
distinct families of models that compute uncertainties globally
over the full distribution for the first, and locally for the second.
We begin by defining the following quantities: let r and s be two
stimuli, represented as vectors of pixel luminances. Call u and v
the left-tilted and right-tilted templates. Then rtu and rtv are
measures of how ‘‘different’’ r is to u and v, respectively. If r is
more like u than v (i.e., rtuwrtv), then it is more likely to have
been generated from u, and hence the observer should respond
‘‘left-tilted’’ for stimulus r.
In comparing the uncertainty between two stimuli - choosing
between r and s - the following procedure is exactly equivalent to
the strategy of the ‘‘ideal observer’’ (i.e., the strategy that
maximizes performance, see Text S1). Compute dabs(r,s) as
dabs(r,s)~ rtu-rtv
       { stu-stv
        ð4Þ
Figure 4. The orientation discrimination problem in stimulus space. The templates u and v are points in a space with dimensions
corresponding to pixel luminances. Here we depict the problem for two pixels only. The optimal decision boundary – a plane - is represented by the
blue line. Stimuli are obtained by starting from one of the two templates and adding a noise vector. They correspond to points in the space lying
around u and v. The response is determined by which side of the plane they fall on. The closer they are from the decision boundary, the higher the
chance that they could have been generated equally well from either template, and therefore the higher the uncertainty. Here, A,B and C are all
points of equal uncertainty, whereas D has higher uncertainty. The uncertainty is given by the entropy of the posterior distribution, see Methods.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000504.g004
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evaluating uncertainty based on the full posterior distribution (see
equation 1): uncertainty is low if one hypothesis corresponds to the
data much better than the other, and high otherwise. We call this
model the difference of responses model.
Another strategy, perhaps simpler for the observer, is to
evaluate uncertainty based only on how well the best hypothesis
fits the data. We call this the maximum response model. The same
measures of distances are computed as in the first model, but only
the maximum is retained for each stimulus. The observer then
compares the two maxima
dmax(r,s)~max(rtu,rtv){max(stu,stv) ð5Þ
Put into perceptual terms, this corresponds to a strategy of picking
the stimulus that seems to have a more salient dominant
orientation, when the templates were Gabor patches, or the
stimulus that was more ‘‘letter-like’’, when the templates were
characters. In statistical terms this is equivalent to evaluating
uncertainty based on the magnitude of the likelihood of the
maximum-likelihood hypothesis (Methods), a strategy that is sub-
optimal for our task but still gives an improvement over choosing
between the two stimuli at random.
Both hypotheses are realistic from a neural-computation point
of view. Computing stu and stv is nothing more than a linear
filtering of the neural input: although some important non-
linearities have been identified in visual orientation discrimination,
linear filtering remains the basic operation in all models [11,12].
Computing the decision variables, whether dabs and dmax,i sa
simple non-linear step readily implementable in a neural system.
To test those models we make the same assumption we did for
regressing choice on difference in log-entropy: the higher dabs and
dmax, the more likely observers are to choose the bottom stimulus.
As above, we compute the decision variables for every trial and we
fit a linear binomial regression model to the responses (Text S1).
Our models give for each trial a choice probability. On figure 6
we plot the percentage prediction correct (i.e., the proportion of
trials where the model predicted with p..5 the choice the observer
actually made). The two models have the same number of degrees
of freedom, and can be directly compared. Both predict the data
significantly better than chance, but the maximum response has a
significant lead. Our data therefore point to a likelihood-based
evaluation of visual uncertainty, rather than one based on the full
posterior distribution.
Discussion
In summary, we demonstrate here that humans display second-
degree knowledge of a visual discrimination task: not only are they
able to detect what signal is in the noise (first-degree knowledge),
but also to estimate how uncertain that knowledge is, at least
comparatively. Why humans should be so well calibrated to what
is in essence a laboratory task rather than a natural one is a
question that deserves attention. It is possible that they learn the
statistical properties of the task over time, although we find no
conclusive evidence for that in our data (see Text S1).
Previous research lacked an objective standard to compare
subjective judgements to, and relied on ratings [13]. Various biases
have been reported in human confidence judgments, including
over- and under-confidence, global/local inconsistencies, as well as
inter-cultural differences [14–17]. The forced-choice method we
outlined here allows one to test human observers’ objective
capacity to detect differences in uncertainty contained in a task,
and to evaluate possible computational mechanisms much more
rigorously. It is a potentially important methodology in the study
of discrepancies between visual performance and confidence, a
topic many believe to be connected to the wider issue of awareness
[18,19], but potentially also in investigations of metacognition in
non-human species [20,21].
Our work is in tune with a variety of current research that tries
to understand visual function as a form of Bayesian inference [22–
25]. These theories posit that the visual system explicitly encodes
probability distributions over perceptual hypotheses. In that
context, it makes intuitive sense that the system should be able
to measure the uncertainty of such a distribution: comparing two
uncertainties as we do here is rarely needed as such, but comes
into play in more complicated decisions. Just as a low feeling of
confidence in an item to be memorized is a clue that further study
is needed [26], high visual uncertainty signals that more
Figure 5. Results of experiment 2 and 3. In these two experiments, the test and the standard stimuli varied in uncertainty. We plot the
proportion of times the test stimulus was chosen as a function of the difference between the uncertainty of the standard and the uncertainty of the
test. The dots represent individual results, the solid line is the average over observers. Experiment 2 used orientation discrimination, experiment3
used letter discrimination. The templates are shown on top of each graph. The levels of uncertainty are standardised across observers, see Text S1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000504.g005
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uncertainty an essential aspect of exploration mechanisms [27].
The results given here agree with other studies that have found
unexpectedly accurate decision-making in perceptual [28,29] and
motor systems [30,31]. These results imply that uncertainty is dealt
with at an implicit level: unlike them, we require observers to make
explicit comparisons between levels of uncertainty. The observers
who took part in our experiment nevertheless found the task quite
intuitive: indeed, we often make comparative judgments of visual
uncertainty ‘‘in the wild’’, as when we judge if we see better from
one vantage point than another.
Generally, we expect that confidence measures have the
potential to play a larger role in computational investigations of
perceptual decision-making. The evaluation of uncertainty is a
necessary first step in any statistical decision-making system, and
biases and approximations in evaluating uncertainty will cause
sub-optimal decisions. A systematic study of the evaluation of
uncertainty in the visual system will help uncover the shortcuts
taken by the brain in making perceptual decisions.
Our method can be generalized to other noise models, other
sensory modalities, and other tasks. But showing that fine-grained
discrimination of uncertainty can be done is of course not an end
in itself: uncovering how that essential operation is achieved in the
brain is a natural next step.
Methods
Additional and more complete methods can be found in Text S1.
Ethics statement
This study was conducted according to French guidelines on
research involving human participants. All participants gave
informed consent.
Experiment 1
Stimuli. The templates used were Gabor patches, with a
standard deviation of 1.4. Observers viewed the stimuli from a
distance of 57 cm. Uncorrelated (white) Gaussian noise was added
to the templates to produce the stimuli.
Observers. 12 observers took part in the first experiment. All
observers had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and gave
informed consent.
Experimental setup. General. Observers were familiarised
with the task with a 20-trial run of the experiment, during which
the experimenter was present. They completed a total of 1000
trials over the course of two sessions. We varied the signal-to-noise
ratio of the stimuli randomly, trial by trial. Feedback on the
orientation task was provided on every trial.
False Choice and True Choice conditions. On each trial, a condition
was chosen pseudo-randomly. In the True Choice condition, the
two stimuli were generated independently from the same noise
distribution. This was done to ensure that the two images had
equal contrast, and that observers could not use that clue to
discriminate between less certain and more certain stimuli. In the
False Choice condition, the first stimulus was computed as in the
True Choice condition, but the second was obtained by flipping
the first either left-to-right or left-to-right followed by up-down.
This made it possible to have two stimuli that were different pixel-
to-pixel, and looked different to the observer, but contained the
same amount of information (i.e., had the same entropy).
Experiment 2
The experimental method was the same as in experiment one,
unless indicated otherwise.
Stimuli. The templates used were Gabor patches, presented
in a square window subtending 5 degrees of visual angle. The
stimuli were generated by adding uncorrelated noise, then
Figure 6. Proportion of correct predictions for three models of choice. The maximum of response and absolute difference models are
presented in the text. Observers presented a bias in their choice of stimuli (most of them choosing the top one with a proportion higher than
chance), so we plot the proportion correct of a model that predicts observers always choosing the stimulus to which they are biased (Bias only, see
Methods).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000504.g006
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Text S1.
Observers. 8 observers took part in the second experiment,
including the first author. All observers had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision and gave informed consent.
Experimental setup. Observers were familiarised with the
task with a 10-trial run of the experiment, during which the
experimenter was present. Observers then completed a total of
500 trials in one session. The difference in uncertainty between the
test and the standard stimuli was chosen at random on every trial,
between four different levels (see Text S1). Feedback on the
orientation task was provided on every trial.
Experiment 3
The experimental method was the same as in experiment 2,
unless indicated otherwise.
Stimuli. The templates used were a T and a X, rendered in a
sans-serif font. The templates are shown on figure 5. The contrast
of the templates was adjusted so that they had equal energy.
Observers. 4 observers took part in the third experiment,
including the first author. All observers had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision and gave informed consent.
Experimental setup. Observers were familiarised with the
task with a 10-trial run of the experiment, during which the
experimenter was present. Observers then completed a total of
500 trials in one session. The difference in uncertainty between the
test and the standard stimuli was chosen at random on every trial,
between four different levels (see Text S1). Feedback on the
orientation task was provided on every trial.
Supporting Information
Text S1 Supporting Information.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000504.s001 (1.21 MB
DOC)
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